Was the Argentine “corralito” an efficient measure?: a note by Samartín Sáenz, Margarita et al.
Was the Argentine corralito an efficient measure?: A noteB
Margarita Samartı´n T, Clara Cardone, Rodrigo Bustamante
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain
Received 15 October 2004; received in revised form 21 July 2005; accepted 6 September 2005
Available online 10 October 2005Abstract
Theoretical banking literature has largely explored the role of financial intermediaries in the economy, market
failures (banking panics) in the banking sector and the need for bank regulation. However, most models of banking
panics and regulation have not been empirically tested.
The Argentine 2001 crisis, with a large deposit withdrawal and the regulation introduced (suspension of
convertibility) constitutes a scenario in order to apply some of the theoretical predictions.
In particular, the paper applies Samartı´n [Samartı´n, M. (2002). Suspension of convertibility vesus deposit
insurance: A welfare comparison. European Finance Review, 6(2), 223–244] to the particular case of Argentina.
After the estimation of the most important parameters, the model predicts that suspension of convertibility seems to
have been the most efficient intervention measure to stop the massive deposit withdrawals.
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1. Introduction
The financial system has traditionally been vulnerable to the problem of bank runs, in which many or
all depositors at a bank attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously. If these withdrawals at a
particular bank then spread to many or all banks in the banking system they generate a banking panic,
with important consequences on both the financial and the real sector of the economy.1
In the 1980s and 1990s several countries experienced banking panics or periods in which their
banking systems stopped functioning and these economies evidenced important real effects.2 More
recently, at the end of 2001, Argentina experienced a banking panic, which resulted in one of the most
important financial crisis in its history.
Given the relevance of these recent phenomena, the adequate regulatory design of the financial
system has become again an important topic of discussion among politicians, regulators and
academics.
From a theoretical perspective, the literature has focused on analyzing the rationale behind the
existence of financial intermediaries, the causes of banking panics and the different regulatory
measures in order to prevent them (e.g. Allen & Gale, 1998; Alonso, 1996; Calomiris & Kahn, 1991;
Chari & Jagannathan, 1988; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Jacklin & Bhattacharya, 1988; Samartı´n, 2002,
among others3). This stream of research has approached banking panics through two different types of
models.
First, the models of pure panic runs, in which bank runs occur as random phenomena, with no
correlation with other economic variables. Diamond and Dybvig (1983), following Bryant (1980),
attempted to formalize the notion of liquidity seeking behavior by individuals and its implications for the
design of their financing contracts. The paper has important features of real world intermediaries: first, it
incorporates the idea that individuals have uncertain preferences, which gives rise to a demand for
liquidity. This is combined with a second important feature, namely, real investment projects are
irreversible, or at least costly to restart once interrupted and finally, individuals have private information
about the realization of their preferred consumption pattern. It is shown that demand deposit contracts,
which convert highly illiquid assets into liquid deposits, provide a rationale both for the existence of
banks and for their vulnerability to runs. In this framework, the model analyzes two different
intervention policies to cope with bank runs. They advocate that if there is no aggregate uncertainty, a
suspension of convertibility policy would eliminate the bank run equilibrium. Otherwise, a deposit
insurance policy would be more effective.
Diamond and Dybvig’ model attracted an important criticism. Gorton (1988), in an empirical study of
bank runs in the US during the National Banking Era (1863–1913), found support for the notion that
bank runs tended to occur after business cycle peaks, and so they are not the result of bsunspots,Q as
Diamond and Dybvig’s model suggests.
Following this idea, a second branch of research asserts that panics are related to the business cycle,
which seems to support the empirical evidence. In these models, bank runs occur due to the diffusion of1 One example of such crises is the Great Depression (1929 1933), which had a significant impact on the banking system of
the US, where more than one third of the banks failed (see Gorton and Winton (2002)).
2 Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) find that 73% of the IMFs member countries suffered banking crises between 1980 and
1996.
3 A comprehensive survey of this literature can be found in Gorton and Winton (2002).
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negative information among depositors about bank’s solvency (e.g., Allen & Gale, 1998; Alonso, 1996;
Calomiris & Kahn, 1991; Chari & Jagannathan, 1988; Jacklin & Bhattacharya, 1988; Samartı´n 2002).4
The paper aims to analyze if the suspension measure implemented in Argentina (corralito) was an
efficient tool in order to prevent the banking panic of 2001. The question is tackled by applying the
results of Samartı´n (2002). This measure is compared with deposit insurance, which is usually justified
as the regulatory tool that gives stability to the banking system, and avoids banking panics. In this
respect, it should be mentioned that Argentina had a private deposit insurance system, which could not
avoid the banking panic of 2001.
Although there is a large literature on bank runs, however, not so many papers have done a welfare
analysis of regulatory policies. In this sense, we think that Samartı´n (2002) provides important insights
which allow us to understand better how the choice between suspension of convertibility and deposit
insurance is related to economic fundamentals such as the relative risk aversion coefficient, the
expected return on the bank’s assets, and the volatility of returns. These are important insights because
they are based on a model in which information-based bank runs (insolvency crises) and runs unrelated
to low returns on the banks’ assets (liquidity crises) can occur. This is the relevant situation for the
Argentine 2001 crisis because Argentina had a solvency problem (absent growth, it lacked the ability to
pay) and a liquidity problem (it had substantial amounts of short-term debt to be refunded). Also, the
manuscript analyzes how the dispersion of the representative bank’s assets returns influences the choice
between suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance. The results are particularly relevant for the
Argentine crisis because Argentina had a very volatile economy, as shown in Fanelli (2003) for
example.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the analytical framework and provides a
welfare comparison between two measures that have traditionally been used by banks in order to prevent
runs: suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance. The application of the model for the case of
Argentina is carried out in Section 3. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.2. Analytical framework
The purpose of this section is to present the analytical framework that will be applied to the case of
Argentina.5
The model considers a three-period economy and one single commodity. On the consumer side, there
exist a continuum of ex-ante identical agents in the interval [0,1] that are endowed with one unit of this
consumption good in period 0. In period 1, they are subject to a non-observable liquidity shock and they
can be either of two types. The difference between types is that type 1 agents6 derive relatively more
utility from consumption in period 1 with respect to type 2 agents. Individuals have power utility
functions, with a constant relative risk aversion coefficient denoted by c.4 It should be mentioned that there are a number of recent papers that study banking panics in the context of the entire banking
system (Aghion, Bolton, & Dewatripont, 2000; Allen & Gale, 2000; Chen, 1999; Freixas, Parigi, & Rochet, 2000. A survey of
this literature can be found in Gorton and Winton (2002).
5 For a detailed version of this model see Samartı´n (2002).
6 The proportion of this kind of individuals is random and takes a value t1 with probability r and t2 with probability 1 r (and
t1b t2). The expected proportion of type 1 agents is denoted by t¯.
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Table 1
States of nature (Samartı´n, 2002)
hi State t˜ a˜ R˜ Prob. p(hi) Bank runs
1 t1 0 R˜ r(1 q) No
2 t1 a Rh r(1 p)q No
3 t1 a Rl rpq Yes
4 t2 0 R˜ (1 r)(1 q) Yes
5 t2 a Rh (1 r)(1 p)q No
6 t2 a Rl (1 r)pq YesIt is assumed that a random fraction (a˜) of type 2 depositors receive a perfectly informative
signal about the bank’s asset return.7 This signal can be interpreted as a relevant economic variable that
affects the value of the bank (in contrast to the CAPM this source of systematic risk is not known by all
agents). The rest of type 2 individuals do not acquire information and try to infer the state of nature from
the behavior of the other agents.
Finally, in period 0, the bank can invest in a technology that yields a random return (R˜) in period 2.8
As mentioned before, this return is affected by an exogenous risk factor (see Table 1).9
The time structure of the model is summarized as follows: in period 0, individuals deposit their
endowment in the bank and are offered a menu of contracts. In period 1, depositors make their
withdrawal decisions. The decision of type 1 consumers is trivial, as they will always withdraw their
funds. Informed type 2 individuals will withdraw the deposits when they receive a negative signal and
will maintain their funds otherwise. Finally, uninformed type 2 agents behave according to the size of the
queue that they observe at the bank. However, this size can be large enough due to both a negative
information shock or just to a liquidity shock. This noisy signal may induce the non informed depositors
to sometimes erroneously withdraw their funds from the bank. Conditions for both information-induced
and pure panic runs to occur are summarized in theorem 1 of Samartı´n (2002). Bank runs will occur in
states 3, 4 and 6. In states 3 and 6, there will be information induced runs, whereas in state 4 we have a
pure panic run.
Having established the equilibrium with banking panics, we will compare, from an ex ante point of
view, two different intervention measures to cope with runs: suspension of convertibility versus deposit
insurance, given their relative benefits and costs (of randomization in meeting liquidity needs, or the
liquidity cost of suspension and deadweight taxation associated to deposit insurance). In the case of
suspension, it will be desirable when there is no information (state 4) and on the contrary, it will
generate a cost in bad states (states 4 and 6) or when some type 1 individuals do not receive the
promised consumption level (liquidity cost). For comparative purposes, let Csus represent the certainty
equivalent of the expected utility with suspension. An alternative to suspension of convertibility is to
have a full coverage deposit insurance system. This mechanism will remove the incentives of informed
individuals to acquire information and hence to run on the bank as they are always assured the promised7 This random variable may take a value a with probability q and 0 with probability 1 q.
8 This random variable may take a value 0bRl b1 with probability p and Rh N1 with probability 1 p.
9 The three random variables are assumed to be independently distributed. Together, they describe the state of nature, h˜ (t˜ a˜
R˜). Table 1 shows the different states of nature and their associated probabilities.
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Fig. 1. Suspension of convertibility versus deposit insurance (Samartı´n, 2002).(ex ante) consumption level, and will have an utility of EUdep (certainty equivalent of Cdep). However,
the deposit insurance has a cost, that is that, whenever the low return is realized, the bank does not have
enough funds to pay depositors and other sectors have to supply the difference. Let ECdep represent the
expected cost of the insurance. Using the Laffont and Tirole (1986) approach, it is assumed that a
transfer ECdep from the regulatory agent to the bank will generate a social cost of (1+k)ECdep, where k
is a deadweight tax. The welfare measure in the case of a deposit insurance system is
Cdep (1+k)ECdep. Since k is an exogenous variable to the model, the results are presented as a
function of a level of k*, for which the two measures deliver the same utility.10 Hence, if the value of the
deadweight tax is k* percent or lower, the deposit insurance arrangement is best. Otherwise, suspension
of convertibility should be preferred.
Some of the conclusions obtained in Samartı´n (2002) are summarized in Fig. 1. This figure shows the
deadweight tax as a function of the relative risk aversion coefficient (c). As it can be observed, for low
levels of this coefficient (values below a critical c*) suspension of convertibility is always best, even
though deposit insurance could be provided at zero social cost. This region is interesting as it implies that
suspension should be the preferred measure, independently of k. This implies that when agents are not
very risk averse they do not care as much for the liquidity cost associated to a suspension of
convertibility policy. However, as risk aversion increases (above the critical c*) deposit insurance
improves with respect to the suspension measure. As previously mentioned, if the deadweight tax is k*
percent or lower, the deposit insurance arrangement is best, otherwise suspension of convertibility is
more efficient. The critical c is thus the point for which k* is zero. It can be shown that the critical c*, is
affected by other exogenous parameters of the model, such as the bank’s asset expected return (R), or its
dispersion (r2). Both, a decrease in the dispersion in the bank asset or an increase in its expected return
cause a higher value for the critical c. Also increasing the expected proportion of type 1 consumers10 This means k* should be such that Csus Cdep (1+k)ECdep or equivalently, k
 ¼ CdepCsus
ECdep
1.
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increases the critical value. Finally, variations in the proportion of informed agents, or its probability, do
not influence the critical c*.3. Application to the case of Argentina
The main features of the recent Argentine crisis (i.e., a banking panic, the implementation of a
suspension of convertibility policy and the existence of a deposit insurance system), allow us to apply
the previously described model to this particular case.
The application requires the estimation of an important parameter that determines the choice of the
most efficient policy measure: the relative risk aversion coefficient (c). Other relevant parameters in the
analysis are the expected return and the volatility of the bank’s asset.
Those parameters have been estimated for the period April 1995 to December 2001 (the six previous
years to the crisis). The main reasons for selecting this period are the high sensitivity of the results to
variations in the economic environment and the fact that the main features of the financial system in
December 2001 were a consequence of the changes experienced after the Mexican crisis in 1994.
Finally, the deposit insurance system was re-established in 1995. Hereafter, the values for the most
important parameters are estimated.
The analysis is carried out in two steps: First, the critical value of k* for each c is derived (as in Fig.
1). This will also allow us to obtain the critical c, or the value of the relative risk aversion coefficient for
which k*=0. In order to simulate this curve, the following parameters need to be estimated: expected
return and volatility of the bank’s assets (R, r2), expected proportions of type 1 agents (t), proportion of
informed agents and its probability (a; q). Regarding the bank’s asset expected return and its volatility,
they have been approximated by the average and variance of returns for the consolidated banking
system. In the period 1995–2001 banks averaged an annual return on assets of about 0.12% with a
variance of returns of 4.16%. Concerning the expected proportions of type 1 agents, different curves
have been simulated for different expected proportions of type 1 agents, t, that range from 0.1 to 0.8
approximately. Finally, the rest of parameters (proportion of informed agents and its probability), the
ones used in Samartı´n (2002) have been considered. However, as mentioned before, these last
parameters do not influence the critical c*. The parameters used in these simulations are summarized in
Table 2.
Given these values, the simulated curves are shown in Fig. 2, which determine a critical c* of 4.11
(for t=0.103), 4.184 (for t=0.302), 4.26 (for t=0.502) and 4.403 (for t=0.801).
Second, the relative risk aversion coefficient, in the case of Argentina, is derived.
Regarding the relative risk aversion coefficient, it has been estimated with a particular asset valuation
model, like the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) with a power utility function. The
analysis approximates the relative risk aversion coefficient using data relative to the market Sharpe Ratio
and the volatility of the consumption growth rate in a particular economy (for more details and a formalTable 2
Numerical data in the case of Argentina
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Fig. 2. Simulations in the case of Argentina.demonstration see Cochrane, 2001). As already mentioned, this proxy assumes a power utility function,
as the one used in Samartı´n (2002) and can be written as:

E Rmð Þ Rf
r Rmð Þ
 ¼ ec2r2 DlnCtþ1ð Þ 1
p
ccr DlnCð Þ ð1Þ
Where:
! R=Expected market return
! rf=Risk free asset return
! r(RM)=Standard deviation of the market return
! c=Relative risk aversion coefficient
! r(ln C)=Volatility of the consumption growth rate
Hence, isolating the risk aversion coefficient in Eq. (1) it is obtained:
cc
E Rmð Þ Rf
r Rmð Þ
r DlnCð Þ ð2Þ
As mentioned above, the coefficient is approximated with data relative to the expected market return
and its volatility, the risk free rate and the volatility of the consumption growth rate.
The proxy for the market return is the return on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange General Index
(Indice General de la Bolsa de Buenos Aires—IGBBA).11 The choice of the risk free rate for Argentina,
corresponds to the return on U.S. Treasury Bills with maturity of one year. This choice is due to the lack
of a domestic asset that fulfils the required conditions and some features of the Argentine economy in the
analyzed period which allowed a wide access to the international capital markets at a relative low cost.11 See Appendix A for a description of the data used in the analysis.
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Among these particular features were the fixed exchange rate established by the Convertibility Law
which derived in a dual currency economy, the lack of restrictions to the free international capital flows
and the relative low transaction costs to change from one currency to the other.
The average annual real return on the IGBBA for the analyzed period is 4.97% with a standard
deviation of about 33.38%. Since the annual real return on Treasury Bills has averaged 2.5%, the market
premium is 2.48% and the historical market Sharpe Ratio 0.074. The per capita consumption growth rate
has averaged 1.51% with a standard deviation of about 4.77%. Hence, the relative risk aversion
coefficient in the analyzed period is 1.56.
It is worth mentioning that the market return series are affected by some outlier values.12 If those
values are eliminated from the sample, the risk aversion coefficient increases to 3.82, due to the higher
Sharpe Ratio in absolute terms (increases from 0.074 to 0.18). On the overall, the results obtained point
out to an approximate variation range: 1.56bcb3.82.
The estimates of the relative risk aversion coefficient in the case of Argentina are considered
reasonable,13 and present some evidence against the equity premium puzzle observed in several markets
like the American and the Spanish ones,14 among others. The equity premium puzzle refers to the
inability of the basic asset valuation model with consumption to replicate market premiums compatible
with reasonable values of the relative risk aversion coefficient and the observed volatility of the
consumption growth rate. The main explanations for this regularity are: a low consumption growth
volatility, a high observed market premium and a relative low volatility of the market return.
The estimation of the relative risk aversion coefficient described above ranges from 1.56 to 3.82.
Given that these values are all below the critical values of c* (4.11, 4.184, 4.266 and 4.4403), the model
suggests that the suspension measure implemented was the most efficient one, independent on the value
of the deadweight tax (even if deposit insurance could have been provided at zero social cost).4. Concluding remarks
This paper attempts to empirically apply the model developed by Samartı´n (2002), to the particular
case of Argentina. This model presents a welfare comparison between two traditional measures to
prevent banking panics: suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance.
The features of the recent Argentine crisis (i.e., a general banking panic, the implementation of a
suspension of convertibility policy and the existence of a deposit insurance system) constitute an
interesting scenario in order to apply the above mentioned model.
Samartı´n (2002) compares from an ex ante point of view, two different intervention measures to cope
with runs:15 suspension of convertibility versus deposit insurance, given their relative benefits and costs
(of randomization in meeting liquidity needs, or the liquidity cost of suspension and deadweight taxation
associated to deposit insurance). The results suggest that when agents are not very risk averse (they have12 Those outlier values were due to the economic stability and the fast development of the capital market generated by the
structural reforms implemented: transition to an open economy, privatization of state companies and the pension system, free
international capital flows, etc.
13 See Cochrane (2001) and Gollier(2001) for discussions concerning reasonable values of the coefficient.
14 For a description of the equity premium puzzle in those markets see Cochrane(2001) and Marı´n and Rubio (2000).
15 No matter the nature of runs, as there can be both information induced and pure panic runs.
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a relative risk aversion coefficient below a critical one c*, they do not care so much for the liquidity cost
and so they would prefer a suspension policy to having a deposit insurance system. On the other hand, as
agents become more risk averse (above the critical c*), they prefer a deposit insurance system to a larger
extent. So, a crucial aspect in the application is determining on one hand the critical value of c* for
which the critical c* becomes zero, given the parameters of Table 2, and on the other hand, the relative
risk aversion coefficient in the case of Argentina.
The estimation of the relative risk aversion coefficient in the case of Argentina ranges from
1.56bcb3.82, and the estimation of the critical c* for different parameters, gives values above 4.11.
These results imply that we fall in the region where the suspension measure gives higher utility, and so
these results suggest that the suspension of convertibility implemented turned out to be the most efficient
tool.
Finally, several weaknesses of the model should be mentioned. First, the paper relies on a partial
equilibrium analysis and so it does not take account of the exchange rate regime. It just implicitly
assumes that the bank’ return R˜, is affected by some exogenous source of aggregate risk or systemic
factor (which could be the exchange rate regime). However, integrating the currency board into the
analysis is important to understand the Argentine crisis. This is because a correction of the real exchange
rate misalignment implied a solvency problem for the financial system, that was financing private
domestic borrowers mainly in dollars. On the other side, those borrowers had incomes that were mostly
in pesos. Probably, bank runs were motivated by heterogeneous expectations. Some depositors feared a
nominal devaluation and so converted their deposits in pesos into dollars while others feared a
pesification.16 Another important point might be that different agents could be affected differently by the
kind of financial problems which occurred in Argentina. Depositors would probably like deposit
insurance since it transfers resources from other sectors of the economy to the depositors. Agents who
hold real assets prefer suspension of convertibility because it prevents the redistribution. While not
addressed in this paper, these issues represent interesting lines for future research. A final limitation of
the paper is that it does not take into account the duration of the corralito. In this respect, Perry and
Serven (2003) argue that the deposit freeze had been disruptive because it was held for a long period of
time without resolution. They also point out that the crisis had been anticipated for several months.
Hence, large and informed depositors had time to withdraw, leaving only small depositors in the banking
system.Appendix A. Data description! Per capita consumption growth rate: annualized growth rate of the quarterly series of private non
seasonal consumption obtained from National Accounts published by Instituto Nacional de
Estadı´sticas y Censos de Argentina [INDEC]. The population data are also estimates of the INDEC.16 In this respect an important issue was whether dollarization could have prevented bank runs. For example, De la Torre, Levy
Yeyati, and Schmukler (2003) argue that a banking panic was less likely under dollarization. On the other side, Roubini (2001)
argues that dollarization could not prevent bank runs because they were basically insolvency based and even if the country
decided to dollarize, severe capital and exchange controls, as well as a bank freeze, should have been maintained to have an
orderly restructuring of domestic and foreign claims of government, firms, banks and households, i.e. the transition to a
dollarized system (even without a final devaluation) would be messy.
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! Market return: annualized real return on the monthly series of the Indice General de la Bolsa de
Buenos Aires.
! Risk free rate: annualized real return on Treasury Bills (monthly series) with maturity one year
published by the U.S Federal Reserve.
! Expected return and volatility of the bank’s asset: average return on assets (ROA) and variance of
returns estimated from monthly data from the consolidated balance sheet of the financial system
(Banco Central de la Republica Argentina).
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